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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Interested in art, we tend to be interested in works of art.  We seem to encounter 
works of art all the time, and—setting aside certain relatively abstruse problems in 
ontology—we seem to have little difficulty in recognizing them for what they are.  
That there are works of art seems obvious and unproblematic. 
 Quite so, I think.  But reflection on what has to be the case if there are to be works 
of art shows that some quite demanding conditions have to be met.  Some will find 
those conditions too demanding: if I am right, that means that they should not admit 
that there are any works of art, and they will have to give some other account of what 
might be involved when we think we are dealing with a work of art.  For myself, I 
think the conditions are not too demanding: their interest comes in what they show us 
about the nature of artistic ‘media’, and about what is involved in being a great artist. 
 
II.  ART IS INDEFINITELY RE-INTERPRETABLE 
Art is essentially meaningful: it has a certain kind of significance.  We cannot 
consider art as art without being concerned with its meaning or significance.  The 
significance of art has a certain character, which we might try expressing in part in the 
following claim: 
 
(AIR) Art is indefinitely re-interpretable. 
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The reason for wanting to accept (AIR) is that unless it is true we cannot understand 
how it might be that interpretation can never be finished.  And I think it is absurd to 
suppose that we might finally have done with the interpretation of some piece of art.  
Imagine a critic who said, ‘There: nobody need ever write about Shakespeare again’.  
Or one who said, ‘That’s cracked it: you need never listen to another performance of 
the Well-Tempered Clavier’.  One reason for thinking that such claims would be 
absurd is that they seem to suggest that, once these final and definitive interpretations 
have been produced, there is no reason to pay any attention to the art itself.  Complete 
and final interpretation seems to make art itself redundant.  If that is right, one reason 
for accepting (AIR) is that it is part of what is required if we are to do justice to the 
(roughly Kantian) thought that it is essential to the nature of art that it asks us to linger 
with it, to dwell on it.1 
 That is an initial explanation of the rationale for accepting (AIR).  It might 
nevertheless be objected to: I will consider some objections a little later.  But in the 
meantime more needs to be done to explain exactly what (AIR) means.  Its meaning 
depends on what interpretation is.  I will stipulate, to begin with, that there is the 
following link between interpretation and meaning: 
 
(IM) Interpretation is the revealing of meaning. 
 
But I assume no further restriction on what counts as interpretation.  Meaning might 
be revealed by an attempt to say explicitly what something means; but it might be 
revealed in a number of other ways.  In the case of painting, for example, we might 
cover a portion of a canvas up, before uncovering it again, in order to show more 
clearly what is done by the covered-up portion.  In the case of a poem, we might read 
it in one way rather than another, or in one way and then in another.  The same applies 
to a piece of (written) music: we might play it one way rather than another, or again, 
in one way and then in another.  In the case of a play, we might choose a certain kind 
of set, and actors with certain physiognomies to play particular roles.  These can all be 
ways of revealing meaning without saying anything at all.  They all count as 
interpretations for the purposes of (AIR).  It is difficult to say what an interpretation 
must involve—beyond revealing the meaning of what is interpreted—but in many 
                                                 
1
  In Kant, of course, the lingering is simply with the beautiful (and principally the beautiful in 
nature): Kant (1790: §12). 
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cases what characterizes an interpretation will be simply that it makes some things 
salient, and some things unsalient, in the piece of art with which it is concerned.  
 The reason for insisting that interpretation is the revealing of meaning is that it 
rules out a gross subjectivism about the meaning of art, which might be expressed like 
this: 
 
(SM) Art has no meaning other than what an interpreter finds in it. 
 
Without the conception of interpretation as the revealing of meaning, some 
subjectivism such as that expressed in (SM) might be taken to be natural ground for 
accepting (AIR).   
 But (SM) is obviously untenable: nobody can engage in interpretation while 
seriously thinking that (SM) is true.  (SM) makes interpretation nothing but idle self-
indulgence, and it makes art nothing more than a pretext for constructing something 
of our own.  This seems to lead to a devaluing of art: it makes art itself unnecessary.  
If art itself has no meaning other than what an interpreter finds in it, it is hard to see 
how it can have any role other than as a provoker of effects which could, in principle, 
have been reached in another way.  If we can find such another way to get those 
effects, there is no need to attend to the art.  And, as I have suggested, part of the point 
of insisting on (AIR) is to prevent art itself being unnecessary; so (SM) cannot be the 
real ground for accepting (AIR). 
 Once we have ruled out a simple-minded subjectivism, we can be more precise 
about what is important about (AIR) itself.  In the first place, (AIR) now shows itself 
clearly to be a claim about the kind of meaning which art has—rather than a claim 
which is merely about our attitudes to it.  Moreover, the meaning which a work of art 
has it must have antecedently to any actual interpretation.  We can, if we like (though 
this would be a matter for further consideration), give a secondary-quality account of 
the meaning of art.  That is to say, we might claim that we cannot understand what it 
is for art to have meaning except in terms of its being such as to be interpreted with 
such a meaning by a well-placed interpreter.  But this secondary-quality account of 
the meaning of art falls well short of the radical subjectivism of (SM): something can 
be such as to be interpreted as having a certain meaning without actually being so 
interpreted, and it can be such as to be interpreted in a certain way by a well-placed 
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interpreter, even if a poorly-placed interpreter misunderstands it or fails to understand 
it at all. 
 (AIR) makes something like the following claim about the distinctive kind of 
meaning which art has: what is special about the meaning of art is that one cannot be 
finished with revealing it.  We might try to put that slightly more precisely as follows: 
 
(AIR*)  If a is a piece of art, then however many times a has been interpreted, 
it is always possible for there to be a new interpretation of a. 
 
The significance of this formulation depends, in turn, upon what it is for an 
interpretation to be new.  A ‘new’ interpretation will not just be one that has not 
actually been proposed or encountered before.  For an interpretation might not have 
been proposed, and yet be all too predictable.  And if an interpretation is predictable, 
we don’t need to attend to the art itself to recover it: once we’ve cracked the code, as 
it were, we can find it independently of attending to the art.  To avoid that, we need 
what is revealed by a new interpretation to be something which could not have been 
predicted before.  And this presents us with a prima facie difficulty: if what is 
revealed by a new interpretation were not already determined by what was 
antecedently present in the piece of art, it is hard to see how it could really have been 
there—in advance of having actually been found by an interpretation. 
 The solution, I think, is to borrow a lesson from chaos theory, and distinguish 
radically between predictability and determination.  ‘Chaotic’ processes are 
deterministic: in fact, they may even involve the instantiation of relatively simple 
laws.  But their outcomes are sometimes not predictable, because it is (sometimes) 
physically impossible to model processes which are chaotic, in the sense of chaos 
theory, more quickly than they actually occur.  We do not need to suppose that the 
unfolding of the meaning of a piece of art is itself a process which is chaotic in this 
precise sense (although such processes might be involved), but this does not prevent 
us from drawing from chaos theory the general model that unpredictability does not 
mean lack of determination.  And, in fact, determined but unpredictable is precisely 
the way in which what is revealed by a new interpretation of a piece of art presents 
itself to us.  For example, if we hear a new interpretation of a piece of music—one 
that does not just get the music wrong, or go off on an enterprise of its own—we think 
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simultaneously both ‘I’d never have thought of it like that’ and ‘But you can see that 
it’s there in the notes’. 
 So much for the clarification of (AIR), as a thesis about what is distinctive about 
the meaning of art.  Not everyone will accept it, however.  I will consider two kinds of 
objection. 
 First, some will think that it is simply not essential to art, however great it may be, 
that it be re-interpretable.  The core phenomenon, on this view, is that art is always re-
visitable, is always something to be lingered over, but the reason for its being always 
re-visitable, or always to be lingered over, is not that there is always more to be 
revealed of its meaning.  What other reason might there be?  The natural suggestion is 
just: the experience of the art is intrinsically pleasant, and pleasures are such that it is 
rational to want to repeat them and extend them.2 
 I do not deny that the experience of art is often pleasant, but I think that this is 
unsatisfactory as an account of what is distinctive about art.3  In the first place, I can 
coherently think that there is something to be lingered over in art which I do not much 
like.  As it happens, I do not myself much like Wagner (simply because of the 
character of the music).  But I have no difficulty telling that there is something in 
Wagner’s music which is worth lingering over—even worth my lingering over, 
although the lingering will not be an unmitigatedly pleasant experience.  Secondly, 
when I take pleasure in the experience of art, the pleasure is not a kind of pleasure 
which anything but art can provide.  And it seems to me that the pleasure I take is 
always, in part at least, a pleasure in the indefinite extendability of the discovery of its 
meaning.  When I experience again a familiar work of great art, at least part of my 
pleasure is in fact a pleasure of discovery, of finding something new.  It seems to me a 
kind of philistinism to suppose that all one might want of the experience of art is a 
certain kind of kick, or a certain kind of therapy.  And of course, to suppose that the 
point of experiencing art is to get a certain kind of kick, or a certain kind of therapy, 
                                                 
2
  A suggestion along these lines was made by Jerrold Levinson. 
3
  It is also, I think, quite unsatisfactory as an account of the motivation for attending to art, for two 
related reasons.  First, it is entirely general: pleasure can be used as a reason for choosing anything, so 
this does not explain why we should attend to art in particular.  And secondly, with the possible 
exception of extremely primitive pleasures (sex is the obvious example), our pleasure is itself a feeling 
of the value of something, so that it is what is valuable about what we enjoy which is our fundamental 
motive, not the mere fact that we enjoy it.  This seems clearly the case with art: it is hard to imagine 
anyone who cares about art who does not think (or hope) that the pleasure they take in attending to art 
is a reflection of something which is independently important about art, whose value is the rational 
ground of our pleasure. 
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looks as if it risks making the art itself is strictly inessential to what is got out of it: the 
same effect could in principle be produced by something other than art.  It is in part to 
avoid that result that we want to endorse (AIR); and that gives us reason for preferring 
(AIR) to this hedonistic theory.  Finally, and most simply, it seems obvious in fact 
that there is always more to be discovered about the meaning of great art: great 
performers, of music or drama, reveal something new in their performances, however 
many performers have preceded them; great critics show us something we had not 
seen in the art which they consider, however much we are acquainted with a long 
tradition of criticism.4 
 A second objection to (AIR) is that it is only great—or at least pretty good—art 
which is indefinitely re-interpretable.  Someone might write a fugue which is so trivial 
that there is really nothing to say about it.5  Or a poem—an extremely banal haiku, for 
example—might be so limited in its resources that its bottom is very quickly reached. 
 This issue strikes me as being surprisingly difficult to settle.  On the one hand, it is 
not obvious that something is bound to be art if it has the superficial form of art: so 
being a fugue or a haiku may not be enough to make something art, for example.  Nor 
is it clear that merely thinking one is producing art, or intending to produce art, is 
enough to guarantee success.  And, on the other hand, surprisingly minimal things are 
indefinitely re-interpretable: it is not altogether absurd, for example, to see 
Beethoven’s famous set of variations as a collection of ways of revealing the meaning 
of an apparently trivial waltz by Diabelli.  There is also the intriguing category of 
boring art: in the case of boring art, one can see that there are indefinite possibilities 
of re-interpretation, and one can recognize that each such interpretation will be in 
some sense new, but for all that, it can quickly be clear that each new interpretation 
will have a certain unsurprisingness about it, and one can be, in consequence, already 
weary at the thought of it.6 
 But even conceding the point of this objection will not, in fact, damage my larger 
purposes in this paper.  (AIR) and (AIR*) can easily be modified to restrict them just 
                                                 
4
  This is why I think it is never enough to have heard just one performance of a piece of written 
music, or to be content with just one recording of it: in effect, what happens then is that the 
performance or recording replaces the piece of music itself, and the fact that it is a performance (whose 
business is to reveal what is there in the work) is then forgotten.  (Perhaps unsurprisingly, Jerrold 
Levinson disagrees about this.) 
5
  This example was suggested in conversation by Andrew Kania. 
6
  Paul Davies alerted me to the importance of art which one no longer wants to be bothered with. 
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to great, or at least pretty good, art.7  Such a modification might give us this, for 
example, instead of (AIR): 
 
(GAIR) Great art is indefinitely re-interpretable. 
 
It will be enough for my purposes if there is at least some art which is indefinitely re-
interpretable,8 and that, I think, is beyond dispute.  My question will then be this, in 
the first place: how can there be great works of art?  Of course, if there could not be 
any great works of art, it would have to be doubtful that there can be any works of art 
at all: there would seem to be a problem with the very idea of a work of art.  Either 
way, the same large conclusions about artistic ‘media’ will follow. 
 
III. WORKS OF ART ARE MADE TO BE INDEFINITELY RE-INTERPRETABLE 
So far I have spoken evasively of ‘art’ and ‘pieces of art’, in order to avoid any very 
strong commitment on the question of the nature of the objects which are our 
immediate concern when we are concerned with art.  But usually we think it is just 
obvious what these objects are: they are works of art.  What does this involve? 
 We can understand the concept of a work of art as defining a species of a family 
within a genus.  The genus is defined by the general concept work.  A work is 
something which is produced by work—that is to say, it is worked.  So works, in 
general, are defined by this condition: 
 
(W) Something is a work only if it is made intentionally. 
 
Within this genus, a more specific kind of thing (a family) is defined by the concept 
meaningful work.  A meaningful work is something which meets this condition: 
 
(MW) Something is a meaningful work only if it is made to be interpretable. 
 
                                                 
7
  And perhaps (AIR) and (AIR*) do not even need to be modified.  It is natural to think that art must 
be defined normatively: to think of something as art is to think of it as something for which a certain 
kind of feature would be a defect.  In that case, (AIR) and (AIR*) could stand as they are, just as it 
remains true to say that tigers are quadrupeds, despite the (possible, at least) existence of three-legged 
tigers, because the concept of a tiger is the concept of something for which anything but four-
leggedness would be a defect. 
8
  This point was made to me by Robert Hopkins. 
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The point of a meaningful work is that it has a meaning: it is made in order to have a 
quality (its meaning) which is there to be understood.  And works of art are a special 
case of meaningful works, because the meaning they are meant to have is of a special 
kind.  So if we keep the original versions of (AIR) and (AIR*), it seems that works of 
art are things which meet this condition: 
 
(WA) Something is a work of art only if it is made to be indefinitely re-
interpretable. 
 
If we varied (AIR) in the manner of (GAIR), then we would expect a corresponding 
variation in (WA).  Since it is implausible that every great work is made to be a great 
work, we would need something like this instead of (WA): 
 
(WA*) Something is a work of art only if it is made to be of a kind the great 
examples of which are indefinitely re-interpretable. 
 
(It is worth noting briefly that I have used ‘interpretable’ and ‘re-interpretable’, rather 
than ‘interpreted’ and ‘re-interpreted’: there is nothing in these conditions which 
blocks the possibility of secret, or ‘private’, meaningful works or works of art.) 
 A few examples will show how these conditions apply.  The architectural works of 
Vauban, the great French military engineer, are fortifications which can be found all 
round France.  These are evidently made intentionally, but they are not made to have a 
meaning: it does not matter—at least for Vauban’s purposes—how anybody interprets 
them; what matters is how effective they are at protecting places of strategic 
importance.  The same cannot be said, however, of Descartes’s philosophical works: 
these are things which are made to have a meaning, for which it matters how they are 
interpreted.  But Descartes’s aim was not to produce something indefinitely re-
interpretable, or even something of the same kind as indefinitely re-interpretable 
works: it was, rather, to produce something which would be interpreted in a certain 
particular way—as a defence of science, for example.  In contrast to both of these, a 
work of art is precisely designed to be indefinitely re-interpretable, or at least to be of 
the same kind as something which is indefinitely re-interpretable: it is designed to 
belong to a kind which can have the sort of meaning which was our concern in the last 
section.  Or so I claim. 
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 The intentions with which these things are made determine their function (given a 
certain competence in the making); since function provides a basis for evaluation, 
these intentions fix a standard for evaluation of the various kinds of work.  So if a 
work is not a meaningful work, it is defective if it does not do what its author meant it 
to do—protect a strategic port, say, in the case of Vauban—but not if it fails to have a 
certain meaning.  And if a work is a meaningful work, but not a work of art, it is 
defective if it fails to mean what the author wanted it to mean, but not if it is not 
interestingly re-interpretable.  It seems that (W), (MW), and (WA) (or (WA*)) display 
a plausible increase in the specificity of purpose which works of the various kinds 
have, but the claim of (W) and (MW) to characterize significant kinds is not central to 
my purposes now.  What matters is just the truth of (WA) or (WA*), and the fact that 
works of art must also meet the conditions imposed by (W) and (MW). 
 Those points might be challenged in three obvious ways.  The first challenge is on 
quite general grounds, and is directed at (W), as well as the claim that works of art 
have to meet the condition imposed by (W).  This is the challenge of the Platonist in 
the ontology of art: someone who holds that works of art—or perhaps just works of 
some art (music, say)—are not made at all, but exist eternally.9 
 Platonism in the ontology of art strikes me as being undermotivated; and in any 
case, I think we do it no great injustice if we regard it as not being concerned with 
works of art at all.  Let’s take these two points in turn.  The motivation for Platonism 
in the ontology of art is provided by some such argument as this (see Dodd 2006: 10): 
 
(P1) In the case of some arts, there can be multiple copies of what we think 
of as the same work, without there being anything which is more 
authentic than any of the multiple copies; 
(P2) That possibility is best explained by the copies being instances of a 
kind which is what we think of as the work, or tokens of a type which 
is what we think of as the work; 
(P3) Kinds and types are eternally existing entities; so 
(P4) It is best to think of what we think of as works in the relevant arts as 
being eternally existent entities. 
 
                                                 
9
 See, e.g., Wolterstorff (1980, Kivy (1983), and Dodd (2006).  For one line of criticism of this kind of 
view, see Morris (2007). 
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Others (e.g., Levinson (1980)) will worry about (P3).  My own concern is with (P2): I 
don’t think enough alternative explanations have been considered for this claim to be 
justified. 
 But even if (P1)-(P4) were felt to offer a compelling argument in favour of taking 
what we think of as works in the relevant arts to be eternal entities, it provides no 
reason yet for thinking that there is anything which is really a work which is an 
eternal entity.  For the argument might equally be taken to show that there are not 
really any works in the relevant arts which meet the condition elaborated in (P1).  It 
seems to me that Platonism is quite naturally understood as a proposal about what 
matters aesthetically in the relevant art forms: on this view, it is not works we are 
concerned with (whatever we might normally think), but certain abstract structures.  
Alternatively, we might regard Platonism as a proposal to relocate the concept of 
work in relation to the relevant art forms: so we might regard the performance of a 
piece of music—something which does not itself have instances, and which we might 
think was created—as the work, while what it is taken to be a performance of—the 
thing which we normally think of as the work, in the case of composed music—is not 
really a work, but an eternally existing abstract structure. 
 So the challenge from the Platonist can be set aside.  The second challenge to 
(WA)—or (WA*)—is that it is too precisely tailored to works of art produced in a 
very particular period, within one particular tradition—the high-culture tradition of 
western Europe.  So someone might claim that it is easy to find examples of works of 
art which fail the condition imposed by (WA) or (WA*), even in western Europe.  On 
the one hand, it might be claimed that church carvings by mediaeval craftsmen (for 
example) count as works of art, even though the craftsmen themselves did not think of 
them as indefinitely re-interpretable in the relevant way, or even as belonging to a 
kind the best specimens of which are indefinitely re-interpretable.  And, on the other 
hand, it might seem that anti-traditional works like Duchamp’s ‘ready-mades’ 
precisely reject the ideal of lingering contemplation enshrined in (WA) and (WA*). 
 These two aspects of the second challenge to (WA) or (WA*) need to be treated 
differently.  Let’s begin with the case of the mediaeval craftsman.  We can use four 
considerations to defuse this worry.  First, we can be more permissive about when to 
attribute intentions such as those involved in (WA) or (WA*) than the worry 
imagines.  It will turn out (in the next section) that intending to produce something 
which is indefinitely re-interpretable involves treating the artistic medium in a certain 
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way.  We can regard someone who treats the medium like that as having a suitable 
intention, even if she doesn’t have the full conception of indefinite re-interpretability 
which I developed in the last section.  And it can be made plausible that at least some 
mediaeval craftsmen treated their medium in such a way. 
 Secondly, it does not follow from the fact that only works of art are made to be 
indefinitely re-interpretable, that other kinds of thing are not indefinitely re-
interpretable.  In particular, it will be plausible that in developing a conception of 
artistic media which is capable of making sense of works of art being indefinitely re-
interpretable, we will have made sense of the possibility of all meaningful works in 
the same or similar media being indefinitely re-interpretable.   So it will be all right to 
treat any meaningful work—something which satisfies the condition imposed by 
(MW)—rather as one does a work of art, even if it would not necessarily be counted a 
defect in it if it turns out to be rather uninteresting as a work of art. 
 Thirdly, it is possible, of course, to take an aesthetic interest in things other than 
works of any kind: it is possible to take an aesthetic interest in nature, for example.  It 
may be that some of our interest in objects created by distant cultures is more closely 
comparable to an aesthetic interest in nature than it is to a concern with works of art. 
 And, finally, it may be simply indeterminate whether something was produced 
with the requisite intention, and therefore whether it counts as a work of art, or a 
meaningful work at all.  If we take proper account of these four considerations, it is 
hard to see how works produced in a not- (or not-yet-) self-consciously-aesthetic 
culture can provide any decisive problem for (WA) or (WA*) 
 What, then, of things like Duchamp’s ‘ready-mades’?  There is a serious 
indeterminacy about what we are considering here.  In the particular case of 
Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’, are we considering Duchamp’s action, in placing a urinal in a 
gallery, signing it (with an obviously bogus name), and calling it ‘Fountain’?  Or are 
we considering the gesture he made in performing that action?  (The difference which 
it is natural to find between the action and the gesture is that the gesture looks as if it 
was made in order to be interpretable in a certain way—which makes it look as if the 
gesture is a kind of meaningful work, according to (MW), even if the action is not.) 
Or are we considering the urinal itself, in its environment in the gallery, with its 
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signature, and its name ‘Fountain’?  The action itself is not a work at all;10 nor is it 
obviously of much aesthetic concern.  As for the gesture, if we treat it as a meaningful 
work, we can see it as making a statement about art and culture.  It might be healthy 
to be reminded of this statement when we go to a gallery—which would justify the 
continued display of the urinal—but this would not make it a work of art, any more 
than any kind of art-movement manifesto is itself a work of art. 
 Might the urinal itself, in the environment of the gallery, and with its label and 
signature, be a work of art?  If it were, of course it would not, strictly, be ‘ready 
made’: it would be constructed out of the antecedently existing matter of the urinal, 
the gallery (and its attendant traditions), the signature, and the title.11  The real 
problem with this constructed object is close to the problem raised by the case of the 
mediaeval craftsman: was this constructed object made with the right intentions—
with the right attitude to the medium?  This seems to me, as a matter of historical fact, 
rather doubtful.  It seems to me more likely that Duchamp was cocking a snook at the 
pretensions of the art world, rather than inviting us to dwell on the significance of a 
mundane, indeed embarrassing, object in the environment of a gallery, and with the 
imprimatur of a signature and a title.  Others might do what I suspect Duchamp was 
not doing, and they would then be creating works of art, and the works they would be 
creating would meet the condition imposed by (WA) (and so a fortiori (WA*)) 
without difficulty.  It seems likely to me that Duchamp himself created nothing more 
than a meaningful work, something which was meant to say something, but which 
was not a work of art. 
 The third challenge is that many artists seem not to have been as open to re-
interpretation as (WA) suggests.  Some composers, for example (Beethoven is an 
obvious case), have been strictly directive about how their music is to be played.  
There are two responses to this.  The first is to point out that artists are not always 
                                                 
10
  This means, of course, that some further condition, beyond (W), needs to be met for something to 
count as a work. 
11
  Dodd (2007), p. 138 claims that it is counter-intuitive to deny that ‘ready-mades’ are strictly ready-
made: ‘Putting a piece of driftwood in a gallery does not cause something else to pop into existence in 
addition to the “mere piece of driftwood”’.  There are two things in play in this remark.  One is the 
‘popping’ metaphor; but in fact, setting a urinal in an environment, signing it, and giving it a title is 
more than the waving of a magic wand, so the constructed work does not just ‘pop’ into existence.  The 
other is a very restrictive approach to ontology, which would prefer not to recognize anything other 
than ‘medium-sized dry goods’, individuated in physical terms—but, under pressure, will acknowledge 
such things as kinds, universals, and types (provided these, in their turn, have at their base physical 
principles of individuation).  There certainly seems to be some reluctance to acknowledge anything but 
physical identity-conditions of anything which is non-abstract.  
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consistent: they can both be committed to an enterprise whose whole point, as they 
very well know, is that what is produced is indefinitely re-interpretable, while also 
being personally reluctant to let too many alternatives—or certain particular 
alternatives—be considered.  But, secondly, the most that rigid performance 
directions can do is restrict interpreters in the way they carry out their interpretations, 
but not in the number of interpretations they can offer.  If no variation is allowed in 
performance, performance ceases to be a mode of interpretation, and indefinite re-
interpretability has to be manifested in other ways (in critical discussion, for 
example). 
 So (WA) and (WA*) can survive the obvious challenges to them.  But if either of 
them is true, then, in conjunction with (AIR) (or (GAIR)), a sharp question is raised 
about the very possibility of works of art. 
 
IV. MEANING, MATTER, AND GENIUS 
If (AIR) (or (GAIR)) and (WA) (or (WA*)) are true, with an interpretation understood 
to be a revealing of meaning, then it seems works of art must have a meaning which is 
not a matter of what anyone means by them or takes them to mean.  Consider a range 
of ways of describing someone meaning something by an object O, or taking O to 
mean something: 
 
(i) a means by O that p; 
(ii) a takes O to mean that p; 
(iii) People mean by O that p; 
(iv) Facts of the same general type as (iii) make O mean that p. 
 
(These last two formulations are a nod to Grice and Griceans, with (iv) making room 
for the meaning of a whole to be a function of the meaning of its parts.12)  
 All of (i)-(iv) suppose that what someone means by O, or takes O to mean, can be 
stated.  But when I first introduced the notion of interpretation, I allowed a very 
liberal understanding of it, which means that the notion of meaning should be 
understood similarly broadly.  So consider also: 
 
                                                 
12
  For Grice’s general account of meaning, see Grice (1957); formulation (iv) can be used to provide 
the basis for a response to an objection by Platts (1979), p. 229. 
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(v) a means O to be played like this; 
(vi) a takes this to be the way to say O; 
(vii) a means O to be looked at like this. 
 
(You can imagine Gricean variants of these too.) 
 
 All of these are ways of describing interpretations (in the case of (ii) and (vi)), or 
ways of describing the fixing of an interpretation (in the case of (i), (iii), (iv), (v), and 
(vii)).  And the same will evidently apply to any conception of what someone means 
by an object, or of what someone takes an object to mean. 
 The mere fact that art (or great art) is indefinitely re-interpretable (that (AIR) or 
(GAIR) are true) is not enough to ensure that the meaning of a work of art is not 
determined by anything of the form of (i)-(vii).  For (i)-(vii) describe attitudes which 
someone might have towards a work—attitudes which, in some sense, involve an 
interpretation. And it is not implausible to suggest that attitudes themselves are things 
which are subject to indefinite re-interpretation.  It is natural to think that the 
discipline of history is, in large measure, an account of the attitudes which explain, or 
are manifested in, large historical events.  And it is just about as implausible to think 
that we might have finished the task of history as it is to think that we might have 
finally completed the interpretation of Shakespeare.  If attitudes are themselves 
indefinitely re-interpretable, we can accept that objects are indefinitely re-
interpretable even if their meaning is fixed by something of the form of (i)-(vii): each 
re-interpretation of the attitude manifested in something of the form of (i)-(vii) will 
itself provide a re-interpretation of the object O. 
 But this response is no longer credible if we take the object O to be a work of art, 
and we add (WA) or (WA*) to (AIR)—if we insist, that is to say, that works of art are 
made to be indefinitely re-interpretable, or are made to belong to a kind whose best 
examples are indefinitely re-interpretable.  For even if, as an artist, I have in mind 
some particular meaning which I intend my work of art to have, or which I take my 
work to have, or which I think people, in general, will take my work to have, I must 
also, as an artist, take the meaning of my work—or, at least, of great works—to 
outrun all such interpretations.  The particular interpretation which I am inclined to 
make of my own work may itself be subject to indefinite re-interpretation, if attitudes 
in general are indefinitely re-interpretable, but if (WA) is true, the meaning of the 
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work must always outrun every one even of these re-interpretation (and if (WA*) is 
true, the meaning of a great work must always outrun every one of these re-
interpretations).13 
 The very idea of something having a meaning which is not a matter of what anyone 
means by it, or takes it to mean, can seem bewildering.  And if that is the kind of 
meaning which works of art, or great works of art, have, it is natural to be seriously 
worried about the very possibility of such works of art: how could there be such 
things?  Hence the question of my title. 
 After such a build-up, a quick deflation is bound to be a let-down.  But the question 
has a straightforward answer, and the worry has a simple cure.  The worry is raised by 
the following assumption: 
 
(M) Something’s having meaning is always a matter of something which is 
in itself meaningless being taken to have a meaning, or being used to 
mean something. 
 
And the cure is just to deny that assumption.  We need to suppose that we begin with 
something which is already meaningful, rather than with something which is in itself 
meaningless. 
 How are we to make sense of that?  It is natural to suggest that the crucial work is 
done by the notion of a ‘medium’—as we ordinarily call it.  A work of art can have a 
meaning which is not just a matter of what someone means by it or takes it to mean, 
because it is made in a medium which is always already meaningful—always 
meaningful before anyone makes a work of art in it.   Of course, if we take this line 
‘medium’ will no longer be quite the word.  The problem is that the notion of a 
medium is the notion an intermediary: the idea is that the medium is something which 
is intermediate between a communicator and an interpreter, which the communicator 
uses to convey what she means.  But if (AIR) and (WA) (or (GAIR) and (WA*)) are 
true, an artist cannot think that her business is—or is only—to convey what she 
means; and in that case, the notion of a medium begins to look inappropriate.  It is 
better, I think, to return to the Aristotelian idea of matter, and think of works of art as 
                                                 
13
  Might we not be interested just in the indefinitely re-interpretable intentions of the artist?  Of 
course: but that is not to be interested in the work of art.  And it is important to remember that, in 
general, that the intentions of the artist are only interesting because they are the intentions of the person 
who produced those works. 
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being made of matter which is already meaningful in itself, rather than being simply 
used to mean something.14 
 The business of the artist will then be to do what can be done with matter which 
already means what it does.  And the mark of the artist will be that she is prepared to 
let the matter do its own work, which will permit whatever she makes from it to be 
indefinitely re-interpreted.  But there is nothing surprising in this.  It seems to me that 
this is just a redescription of what is involved in an artist’s being attentive, 
circumspect, and respectful in her treatment of the matter of her art.  Such 
attentiveness, circumspection, and respect are naturally attributed to artists well 
outside the tradition of self-conscious aestheticism which (WA) might seem to 
presuppose.  (They would naturally be attributed to the mediaeval craftsmen who 
made church carvings, for example.)  This strikes me as a plausible conception of 
artistic endeavour in general: much more plausible than the self-importance of trying 
to communicate something.  So with all its other virtues, (WA) seems to encourage us 
to think of artists in ways in which they can reasonably think of themselves. 
 But there is a problem which is linked closely with letting the matter do its own 
work.  If works of art are indefinitely re-interpretable in ways which even their artists 
cannot predict, how can there be such a thing as skill in art?  How can we make sense 
of there being such a thing as a great artist, if no artist can predict what different 
interpretations may reveal about her own work?  The problem is not new, of course: it 
faced Kant, and could have been predicted to emerge at some point the moment (AIR) 
was broached.  Kant’s answer was that the greatness of an artist is inexplicable: it is 
strictly a matter of genius (Kant 1790: §46). 
 If we accept (AIR) and (WA)—or (GAIR) and (WA*)—we have to give 
something like the same answer, but we can work to make it a little less bewildering.  
First, although the artist’s skill is inexplicable in the sense of its effects’ being 
unpredictable, it does not need to be supernatural, unless we suppose that only the 
supernatural is unpredictable.  And secondly, consideration of the implications of 
(WA) suggests that the great artist’s ability is to be understood in quite an everyday 
way—as being due to a deep attunement with the matter of her art, something which 
allows the quality and depth of her work to be predictable, even if every facet of its 
                                                 
14
  It is helpful to remember here that the Aristotelian notion of matter is relative: matter is always the 
matter of something.  Similarly here the matter the artist is concerned with is always relative to the 
work of art being produced, or to some art form: it is always the matter of a work of art, or of an art 
form.  (So it is not just the physical material which the making of the work redistributes.) 
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meaning is not.  More needs to be done to explain in detail what is involved in this 
attunement with a ‘medium’—with the matter of an art; and such an account will have 
to show this kind of attunement not to be just magic.  For all that, our account needs 
to be constructed with care.  The ability of a great artist may not be supernatural, but it 
is not mundane.  We need to preserve some sense of it as something miraculous, a 
proper object of wonder.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 I am very grateful to Kathleen Stock for her comments on an early draft of this paper, and to those 
present at the British Society of Aesthetics conference in September 2008 for their questions when a 
version of this paper was read. 
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